Audit-grade evidence · autonomous pen testing

Evidence, signed.

Pentr runs autonomous pen testing campaigns against your estate (PCI, ISO, SOC 2, OWASP ASVS, NIST CSF, ENS) and seals every artifact in a tamper-evident locker your auditor will actually accept.

Frameworks
6 supported
Evidence integrity
sha-256 sealed
Verification
Offline verifier
4,218
CVEs surfaced
last 90 days, across active estates
91,402
Artifacts sealed
screenshots, req/resp, command logs
4.2min
Mean time-to-evidence
first finding to locker entry
100%
Auditor acceptance
lockers accepted on first review
Watch the agent work

Seven phases. Recorded, scoped, abortable.

A fixed PTES pipeline, run in order. Every step the agent takes is timestamped, signed, and sealed into the locker. Abort the run at any point — the locker keeps every artifact already captured — and nothing executes outside the scope you declared.

[00:00:00] pentr run --framework pci-dss-v4 --scope api.acme.io,*.acme.io [00:00:01] phase 01/07 pre-engagement . scope locked, consent signed [00:00:04] phase 02/07 intelligence ... resolved 26 hosts, 14 services [00:00:38] phase 03/07 threat modeling . 142 routes, 3 admin paths [00:01:58] phase 04/07 vuln analysis .. jwt mis-config 1 · 3 medium · 1 critical [00:02:14] CVE-2024-42121 · CVSS 9.1 · SSRF via /v1/import
Critical
SSRF chain → metadata service
/v1/import → 169.254.169.254 → AWS IMDS v1 → role escalation
+3 artifacts
[00:02:42] phase 05/07 exploitation ...
Six frameworks · one console

Pick a standard. Pentr writes the playbook.

Every control catalog maps to a phase in the agent. Evidence comes back labelled with the control it satisfies — not just dropped in a folder.

How it works

Scope. Run. Seal.

Three operator actions. The agent owns everything in between.

01 · Scope

Point Pentr at an estate.

Hosts, CIDR ranges, wildcards, and a framework. The agent plans every phase from there. No playbook to author.

Hosts & CIDR Authenticated routes Scope enforcement
02 · Run

The agent does the work.

Seven PTES phases in order: pre-engagement, intelligence, threat modeling, vulnerability analysis, exploitation, post-exploitation, reporting. Abort the whole run at any point — the locker keeps what's already sealed.

Scope-locked Signed trace Audit log
03 · Seal

Hand auditors the locker.

Every artifact framework-mapped and tamper-evident. Auditors verify integrity offline with one command, pentr-verify run_2k81m4 --key acme.pub, and walk away.

sha-256 signed Read-only share link CSV / PDF / SARIF export
Evidence locker

Every artifact sealed. Every artifact verifiable.

Auditors don't argue with hashes. The locker is an append-only, sha-256-chained store of every screenshot, request/response pair, command log, and exploit artifact the agent produced, bound to the run, the phase, and the control it satisfies.

  • Tamper-evident.  Append-only sha-256 chain. Mutate one byte, the locker fails verification.
  • Control-mapped.  Each artifact carries the framework control it satisfies: PCI 11.3.1, ASVS V5, ISO A.8.8.
  • Recorded.  Every command, response, and screenshot the agent produced is captured as a signed, re-viewable trace. Nothing anecdotal.
  • Signed.  Every locker is sealed with an Ed25519 signature at seal time, so Pentr can't forge it. Bring your own HSM or KMS key on Enterprise.
Offline verification · pentr-verify runs against an exported locker — no network, no account
Locker · run_2k81m4
PCI DSS v4.0 SEALED
SSRF chain → IMDS v1
screenshot · 11.3.1 · phase 05
02:14:38 UTC
9c4f…2a01
POST /v1/import: payload
req/resp pair · 11.3.1 · phase 04
02:14:21 UTC
e3b1…77af
Command log: exploit_chain.sh
command log · 11.3.2 · phase 05
02:14:02 UTC
5d22…b8c0
Scope & consent attestation
signed manifest · 11.3 · phase 01
00:00:01 UTC
a01f…0921
Discovery: 142 routes enumerated
JSON manifest · 11.3.1 · phase 03
00:01:14 UTC
3b8d…11e7
verify: pentr-verify run_2k81m4 --key acme.pub
Open locker
The console

One place for every run, every finding, every artifact.

Inspect any campaign down to the request/response pair the agent captured at the moment it found the bug.

app.pentr.io / campaigns / run_2k81m4
campaigns · run_2k81m4 · acme · pci-dss-v4
running · phase 05/07
SSRF chain succeeded
run_2k81m4 · started 02:11:34 UTC · operator op_rina_d
4 findings
26 hosts
142 routes
38 artifacts
01 ·
Pre-engagement
02 ·
Intelligence
03 ·
Threat modeling
04 ·
Vuln analysis
05 ·
Exploitation
06 ·
Post-exploitation
07 ·
Reporting
Sev
Finding
Target
Captured
Artifacts
Critical
SSRF via /v1/import: IMDS escalation
CVE-2024-42121 · CVSS 9.1 · ASVS V5
api.acme.io
02:14:38 UTC
High
JWT signature mis-config: none algorithm accepted
phase 04 vuln analysis · ASVS V2
auth.acme.io
02:01:11 UTC
Medium
CORS reflects null origin: credentialed
phase 03 threat modeling · ASVS V14
*.acme.io
01:42:09 UTC
Medium
Verbose error reveals stack trace on 500
phase 03 threat modeling · ASVS V7
api.acme.io
01:38:47 UTC
Low
Missing security headers: HSTS, X-Frame
phase 02 intelligence · ASVS V14
acme.io
00:23:18 UTC
Pricing

Per-campaign. Not per-seat.

You shouldn't pay more for letting your whole security team see the same finding.

ENTRY
€150/mo
For one operator, one estate. Public framework registry, capped at 4 campaigns/month.
  • 4 campaigns / month
  • 30-day evidence retention
  • Community Slack
Start Entry
ENTERPRISE
Custom
For regulated estates: SAML SSO, dedicated tenant, signed by your HSM, on-prem runners.
  • SSO + SCIM
  • HSM-backed signing
  • On-prem agent runners
  • Dedicated CSM
  • 99.9% SLA
Talk to sales
Frequently asked

What auditors and operators ask first.

Yes. That's the entire point. The locker is an append-only sha-256 chain, Ed25519-signed at seal time. Auditors verify integrity offline with pentr-verify run_id --key acme.pub and receive control-mapped artifacts (e.g. PCI 11.3.1 next to the screenshot it satisfies). We've shipped to PCI QSAs, ISO surveillance auditors, and Big-4 SOC 2 reviewers without exceptions.
A scanner finds a possible issue. Pentr's agent attempts to exploit it, captures the chain end-to-end, and seals every step as evidence. The deliverable is a confirmed finding with a signed, re-viewable proof, not a CVE list to chase down.
By default, every locker is sealed with a platform-held Ed25519 key at seal time — so the chain is signed the moment the run ends, and Pentr cannot mutate or forge a sealed locker afterward. On Enterprise, you can bring your own HSM or KMS key so the locker is signed with a key only you control, and signing can run inside an on-prem runner.
Three real controls. Scope enforcement checks every command against your in- and out-of-scope CIDR ranges and domains — anything outside the declared scope is blocked, logged, and reported. A DoS-tool denylist keeps disruptive tooling out of the pipeline entirely. And you can abort the whole run from the console at any point; the locker keeps every artifact already sealed.
There's no self-serve custom playbook — the agent runs a fixed seven-phase PTES pipeline, not a user-authored script. But if you need evidence mapped to an internal or client-specific control catalog, our team sets that mapping up for you as a services engagement. Runs still seal to the same tamper-evident locker.
No. It gives them their week back. Operators use Pentr to cover the repeatable 70% (intelligence, threat modeling, vulnerability analysis, and common exploit chains) and spend their time on the bespoke 30% where humans still win. Consultancies use it to scale across more client estates without scaling headcount.
Stand up your first campaign

Ninety seconds. One signed locker.

Plug in a scope and a framework. The agent does the work. You walk into the audit with evidence already accepted.

No credit card · 14-day pilot · cancel from the console